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I.  INTRODUCTION 
This thesis will examine the relationship between a 
defense firm's reliance on government contracts for revenue 
and the financial condition (health) of the firm. Does a heavy- 
reliance on government contracts tend to produce an unhealthy 
financial position for the firm? Or, is the situation 
completely reversed? Does any relationship exist at all? Has 
the nature of the relationship changed over time? The aim of 
this thesis is to determine if a relationship exist, and if 
so, document what that relationship is. 
In the research, financial data from approximately forty 
defense firms will be analyzed. The period cover by the data 
is from 1983 to 1992. The amount of government business as a 
percentage of total revenue will be used to measure the firm's 
reliance on government contracts (independent variable). 
Various financial ratios developed from the firm's financial 
reports will be used to measure the financial health of the 
firm (dependent variables). Statistical test will be performed 
on the data to determine the relationship, if any, between the 
reliance on government contracts and the financial condition 
of the firms. 
A.  THE OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY 
The objective (and primary research guestion) of this 
thesis is to determine the relationship between a defense 
firm's reliance on government business and the financial 
condition of the firm. To answer the primary research guestion 
the following secondary research questions will be answered: 
1. Is the financial condition of defense firms directly 
related to the amount of government business? 
2. Given a change in the defense industry, is change in 
the financial condition of defense firms dependent on 
the amount of government business? 
3. Did firms that changed their reliance on government 
business do better or worse than firms that didn't? 
4. Do these previous relationships depend on whether the 
industry is in a period of increasing or decreasing 
defense spending? 
The first question tries to determine if a relationship exist 
and what the relationship is. Questions 2 and 3 try to gauge 
the effect of reliance on the financial condition of the firm. 
Finally, question 4 attempts to determine if the relationship 
changes when overall defense spending changes. 
B.  SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
There are three possible results of this study. One, a 
heavy reliance on government business tends to promote a 
firm's financial condition. Second, a heavy reliance is 
inclined to reduce a firm's financial condition. Third, there 
is no relationship between reliance on government business and 
financial health. What do we hope to gain from determining 
which of these three results are correct? It depends on the 
answer. 
If the results show a tendency for a heavy reliance to 
promote a firm's financial condition, then one should consider 
this result when calculating the amounts to be paid for 
defense items. Intuitively, one would think a healthy 
financial condition is based on profits. The more profits, the 
better off the firm is. Therefore, if defense firms who rely 
heavily on government business are generally healthier than 
other firms, then it is reasonable to assume the government is 
paying more than it should. It is not suggested that defense 
firms should not earn a profit. However, abnormally high 
returns, unless associated with higher risk, should be 
questioned. 
On the other hand, if the study suggest that a heavy 
reliance tends to reduce a firm's financial condition, then 
the situation should be explored to determine the causes of 
this association. The government places a number of 
requirements and limitations on its suppliers. More detailed 
accounting is required, additional inspections and reviews 
performed, and a host of reports prepared. There are 
significant costs associated with complying with these 
bureaucratic requirements. When the government signs a 
contract with a firm, the government's intent is to pay the 
cost incurred by the firm to produce the item plus a normal 
profit. Does the intent match reality? If the study suggest 
not, then the process may need to be examined in this light. 
What if there is no relationship? After all there are a 
number of factors that affect the financial condition of a 
firm. It's possible that these factors negate the influence of 
government business. If so then government officials may not 
need to be greatly concerned with the financial condition of 
defense firms. 
Once a relationship has been documented (if there is 
one), another question arises. Does the relationship remain 
constant during periods of increasing and decreasing defense 
spending? One would reasonably expect that during periods of 
increasing defense spending, a heavy reliance on government 
business would tend to promote a healthy financial condition, 
and during periods of decreasing defense spending, a low 
reliance on government business would predispose a firm to 
relatively better financial condition. If this is so, the 
awareness could aid government officials in developing its 
policy toward the defense industry. 
C.  SCOPE/ LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS 
The scope of the thesis is restricted to a statistical 
analysis of the relationship between the reliance on 
government business and financial condition of the firm. 
Revenue received from government contracts as a percentage of 
total revenue will be used to measure a firm's reliance on 
government business. Financial ratios developed from a firm's 
published financial reports will be used as a measure of a 
defense firm's financial condition. The underlying hypothesis 
of this study is that a firm's financial condition is in part 
dependent on their reliance on government business for 
revenue. This study will compare firms with varying levels of 
reliance to determine what, if any, relationship exists. This 
approach was taken because it allows us to use numerical data 
and statistical technigues to answer the research guestions. 
All other factors which effect a firm's financial condition 
will be disregarded in this study. 
These "other factors" are a limitation on the research 
effort. A firm is neither healthy or unhealthy based on one 
factor. A firm neither succeeds nor fails for only one reason. 
A number of factors are usually at play. Upper management's 
policies, style, and abilities have a significant and direct 
impact on the financial condition of the firm. Current 
economic conditions can either promote or hinder financial 
condition. The political clout possessed by Congressmen and 
Senators from the firm's district can ensure continued demand 
for the firm's product even during a period of declining 
defense spending. All of these factors and many more affect 
the financial condition of defense firms. Unfortunately, for 
the most part there is no way to guantify or separate the 
impact of these factors. The effect of these "other factors" 
may cause differences in financial condition, which is not 
explained in terms of reliance on government business. 
Another limitation is inflation. Inflation makes it 
difficult to compare figures over the course of time. 
Inflation understates the value of long term debt and fixed 
assets. A firm with old debt and fixed assets may look better 
than one with recently acguired fixed assets and long term 
debt. Some of the inflationary effects can be reduced by using 
ratios vice actual numbers and by conducting analysis by year 
(i.e. if 10 years of data are collected then 10 test will be 
conducted for each ratio). These methods will reduce the 
inflationary effects, but will not completely eliminate them. 
This study rest upon two assumptions. The first is that 
a firms reliance on government business can be measured by the 
percentage of total revenue that is received from government 
contracts. The larger the percentage, the greater the 
reliance. Since revenue is critical to a firm's continued 
operation, it follows that the larger the share of revenue 
received from one source, the greater the firm relies on that 
source for its continued operation. 
A second assumption is that one can measure a firm's 
financial condition using financial ratios. Financial ratios 
are derived from accounting numbers published in annual 
financial statements. These accounting numbers are not cold 
hard facts. Instead, they are a mixture of facts gathered and 
judgements made (revenue recognition, cost allocation, 
depreciation methods, etc.) in accordance with generally 
accepted accounting principles. These judgements substantially 
affect the various account balances. Consequently, you could 
have the same condition in two firms but, due to different 
accounting policies, the reported condition (the amounts on 
the financial statements) could be quite different. Since the 
financial ratios are derived from the amounts presented on the 
statements, they to can vary. However, its assumed that 
financial ratios can serve as adequate measures of financial 
condition. 
D.  METHODOLOGY 
The methodology employed will be a statistical analysis 
of data from secondary archives. The first step will be to 
define the sample and collect the data. In the second phase, 
measures of financial condition and reliance on government 
business will be developed. The third phase will develop the 
hypotheses and tests to answer the research questions and 
conduct the actual test. In the final phase the results of the 
tests will be interpreted. 
In defining the sample and collecting the data, what 
constitutes a defense firm will be determined first. Once 
guidelines are established, a sample of approximately 40 firms 
will be selected. Published financial statements for the years 
1983 through 1992 will be collected for each firm. The 
required financial ratios will be developed from these 
statements. 
Developing measures of financial ratios and reliance will 
be completed next. The framework for measuring financial 
condition will be developed from a review of literature and 
previous research on financial ratios. Based on the general 
knowledge of what financial ratios measure, plus the results 
of previous research using financial ratios, a tentative list 
of ratios to use will be developed. These ratios will be 
regressed against the percentage of total revenue from 
government contracts to determine if a relationship exists. 
Using the percentage of total revenue received from 
government contracts as a measure of reliance on government 
business is intuitively the best measure of reliance. No other 
ratio would conceptually appear to be any better. 
Least square regression and tests for differences between 
group means are the two statistical methods to be employed to 
answer the research questions. Linear regression will be used 
to establish if a relationship exist between reliance and a 
particular ratio for the first and third secondary research 
questions. The second secondary research question will be 
answered by dividing the sample into groups and performing 
tests of differences between group means. The fourth secondary 
research question will be answered based on the results of the 
test performed  for  the  first  three  secondary  research 
questions. In each, the sample will be divided into two 
groups, the growth period (1983 to 1986) and the declining 
period (1987 to 1992). 
E. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
The level of reliance on government business does have a 
slight positive impact on the financial condition of defense 
firms. As the level of government business increases a firms 
profitability, asset utilization, and short term solvency 
improves. The relationship is strongest when defense spending 
is increasing, however, even then the relationship is very 
weak. Numerous other factors, besides the amount of government 
business, determines the financial condition of defense firms. 
F. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
The remainder of the thesis is divided into four 
chapters. In the next chapter, a description of the defense 
industry will be presented and then a review of prior research 
in the area of defense industry profitability and risk will be 
offered. In the third chapter, methodology employed and the 
data used will be further clarified. In the fourth chapter, 
the analysis of the results from the test performed will be 
presented. Finally, a summary of findings, conclusions 
reached, and recommendations developed will be offered. 

II.  BACKGROUND 
Such procurement scandals as $600 ashtrays and $800 
toilet seats have given the public the impression that defense 
firms earn abnormally high profits at the public expense. 
Additionally, huge cost overruns experienced by many 
procurement programs have had the same consequence. In 
response to these criticisms, a number of studies have been 
done to compare the risk and return in the defense industry 
with the civilian sector. These studies tried to determine if 
the risk involved and return received in the two sectors were 
the same or different. Higher returns in one sector could only 
be supported if the risk in that area was also higher. 
In this chapter we will review the results of studies 
done since the early seventies. However, before the studies 
are discussed, a general description of the defense industry 
will be offered. The intent of this section to provide the 
reader with an understanding of the nature of the defense 
industry. In particularly those aspects that make the defense 
industry more or less risky (aspects not present in the 
civilian sector) will be examined in some detail. 
A.  GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE DEFENSE INDUSTRY 
The defense industry is a highly regulated monopsony. The 
sole buyer in the monopsony, the U.S. government, is also its 
regulator. The U.S. Government through its various agencies 
specifies what cost are allowed, how much profit can be 
earned, who will perform the work, how the accounting is to be 
done, how claims are settled, etc. Further, the government 
provides most of the money and much of the critical plant 
space and equipment. The heavy involvement of the government 
in the operation of the firms is one of the traits that 
separate the defense industries from other industries. The 
government has such a large role because the market is a 
monopsony and not a free market. The forces of supply and 
demand do not determine what is to be produced, how much, and 
at what price. In the defense industry, the government has had 
to replace the market mechanism with an administrative 
mechanism. (Clayton, 1970, p 124) 
In "The Economic Impact of the Cold War", James Clayton 
points out some of the differences between a normal commercial 
market and the defense market. In a normal commercial market 
the seller is the one who takes the initiative to produce the 
product and finances its development. Price is determined by 
the market, and competition within the market keeps prices 
reasonable and in line with risk, cost and other factors. 
However, in the defense industry it is the buyer who takes the 
initiative to develop a new product and provides the financing 
to support its development. Price is set by an administrative 
mechanism established by the government. In the normal 
commercial market the buyer has the option of purchasing a 
product from a number of sellers. In the defense market, the 
buyer, by taking such an active role in its development, has 
in effect already purchased the item. As you can see there are 
a number of differences between the defense industry and the 
commercial industries. (Clayton, 1970, pp. 120-121) Jacques 
Gansler in his book "The Defense Industry" list these and a 
number of other differences. They are reproduced in appendix 
A. (Gansler, 1980, pp. 30-31) 
There is another difference that requires discussion: 
risk. The defense industry faces much of the same risk that 
commercial markets do. However, there are certain aspects of 
the defense industry that elevates or reduces risk in the 
industry. Three particular aspects that require further 
explanation are: national security concerns, the role of 
politics and international affairs, and the procurement 
process. Each are important because of the magnitude of their 
effect on risk. 
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1. National Security Concerns 
There are some programs, industrial bases, that are 
so critical to national security that they are kept in 
business even when there is no current need for their product. 
Firms that build nuclear power aircraft carriers, nuclear 
submarines, military combat aircraft, and military track 
vehicles are some of the more prominent firms in this category 
(Kodghinson, p. 55). The story of the SEAWOLF program is a 
case in point. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
Warsaw Pact, there was no need to build even one SEAWOLF class 
submarine. However, the United States had to retain some 
ability to produce nuclear submarines, so three very expensive 
SEAWOLF class submarines were built. More would have been 
built to keep the shipyard busy, but three were enough to 
carry the industrial base until the next generation submarine, 
the CENTURION class, was ready for production. 
A firm which is the sole producer of one of these 
programs has significantly less risk. There may be some lean 
years at times, but the firm will not go out of business. The 
government will not permit it. Even if senior management makes 
a mistake and gets the firm into financial distress, the 
government will bail the firm out (two examples are Douglas 
Aircraft and Lockheed). So for firms like Electric Boat, the 
only builder of submarines, and Newport News, the only 
producer of nuclear aircraft carriers, the future is safe. 
2. Political and International Affairs 
On the other hand, politics and international 
affairs both reduce and increase risk in the defense industry. 
It is truly a double-edge sword. The annual budget process 
creates considerable uncertainty in defense programs [Gansler, 
1980, p. 32]. Each year defense programs must justify 
themselves to Congress and run the risk of being reduced or 
eliminated. In fact, Wayne Martin reported in "An Empirical 
Assessment of Defense Contractor Risk, 1976-1984" that one 
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could use the variation in Department of Defense's (DOD) 
funding of research and development programs to serve as a 
suitable proxy for inherent program risk and demand variance 
(Martin, 1985, p. 123). The composition of Congress (Doves 
versus Hawks) can change and when it does, the direction of 
defense spending can also change. Likewise changes in foreign 
affairs can rapidly alter the industry. The end of the cold 
war is an example. In the mid 1980's there were about 120,000 
firms in the defense industry. By the early 1990's there were 
only 30,000 (Smith, 1992, p. 89). All of these events are out 
of the defense industry's control and can significantly 
increase the risk of doing business in the defense industry. 
The political aspect can help reduce the risk 
significantly. It is Congress who finally decides what the 
government will purchase, how many items it will buy, and how 
much will be paid. Congressional support for a firm's program 
can be exceedingly beneficial. It can protect a program and 
keep it going even during a period of declining defense 
budgets. Large defense firms sometimes sub-contract work out 
to firms in other Congressional districts in order to build 
support for their program. This is a highly effective 
strategy. One of the benefits of defense firms merging 
(assuming they are not located in the same Congressional 
district) is the two firms' Congressional support also merges 
(Gansler, 1980, p. 77) . Conseguently, the more support a 
program has in Congress, the less the risk faced by the firm. 
3.  The Procurement Process 
The procurement process is an area where risk is 
high at one point in the process and low at another point. 
Risk declines when a company is awarded a development contract 
for a new weapon system. Since the firm that develops the 
program is usually the one who ends up producing the item, the 
firm is assured (almost) a source of revenue for a number of 
years. This substantially reduces the risk to the firm. 
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However, the firm must first win the development contract, and 
this achievement is extremely risky. Because in the defense 
industry there is "no share of the market" it's a winner take 
all situation (Gansler, 1980, pp. 33-34). If the firm is not 
awarded the development contract, then it has no market and 
must scramble to obtain another source of revenue. This 
situation results in a practice called "buy in". 
"Buy in" occurs when defense firms purposefully bids 
low on a development contract in order to receive that 
contract. The firm is willing to risk taking a loss on the 
development contract in order to secure a sole source 
production contract. The firm's intention is to make up the 
loss on cost growth, additional charges on changes to the 
design made by the government, and the production contract 
itself. (Gansler, 1980, pp. 74-75) 
Once a company buys in to a program, its risk is 
reduced considerably. Now that the firm has a long term source 
of revenue (10 to 20 years), its only risk now is to earn a 
profit. Risk is further reduced in that area because a power 
shift occurs between the defense firm and the government. 
Before the development contract is awarded, the government can 
coerce the defense firm to agree to stringent terms in the 
contract. The government can do this because of the other 
competitors for the development contract. However, once the 
development contract is awarded the power gradually shifts to 
the defense firm. By the time production begins, the defense 
firm is in a very powerful position in relation to the 
government. At this point in time, the government has now 
committed itself to the one firm. The government cannot start 
over with another firm. It would take years to develop another 
program, meanwhile the external military threat the system was 
design to meet has been or will soon be deployed. 
Additionally, the government usually cannot take the design to 
another company and have them produce it. A significant amount 
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of corporate knowledge is created during the development 
phase. This corporate knowledge cannot be communicated by 
drawings, documents, etc. The only firm that can reasonably be 
expected to be able to produce the item is the one who 
designed it. So at this point the defense firm is in a 
position to increase its profitability by going to the 
government with "explanations" of "government introduced" 
problems that are increasing cost, causing delivery delays, 
and so forth. The firm uses this tactic to bargain for 
increased price. In summary, risk is high until the firm is 
awarded a development contract but the risk is substantially 
reduced afterwards. (Gansler, 1980, pp. 78-79) 
4.  Conclusion 
A general description of the defense industry has 
been offered. It is a unique industry that cannot be viewed 
from the same perspective one would view other industries. 
Certain aspects of the industry such as national security 
concerns, politics, international events, and the procurement 
process, elevates or reduces the risk faced by firm's in the 
industry. What has not been discussed so far is how well the 
defense industry has actually performed in comparison to firms 
in the civilian sector. That will be done in the next section. 
B.  STUDIES ON RISK AND RETURN IN THE DEFENSE INDUSTRY 
A number of studies have been conducted on profitability 
and risk in the defense industry over the past several years. 
In this section we will review those studies. There are five 
of them and taken as a whole they cover the period 1960 
through 1984. Each study attempts to measure profitability and 
risk in the defense industry and to compare the results to the 
commercial sector. 
There are two difficulties in conducting this type of 
research. One, it's rare to find one firm which only produces 
for the defense market. Defense business is usually only a 
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portion of a firm's activities, and it is very difficult to 
measure the profitability of a portion (segment) of a firm. 
The second difficulty is that the studies have been conducted 
at various times. Competitive conditions change over time and 
new law and regulations are enacted. These events alter the 
situation from year to year and makes it difficult to make 
comparisons over time. (Greer and Liao, 1984, p. 24) With that 
said, the first study to be covered is one conducted by 
Douglas Bohi in 1973. 
1.  Douglas Bohi - 1973 
In "Profit Performance in the Defense Industry", 
Douglas Bohi analyzed the performance of 36 defense firms 
during the period 1960 to 1969. All of the firms were taken 
from the DOD•s annual list of "Top 100 Defense Contractors". 
Return on Net Worth was used by Bohi to measure profitability. 
The first issue Bohi attempted to resolve was to see 
if the relative profitability of the sample of defense firms 
differed from profitability of manufacturing firms in 
general. From a comparison of the results it appeared that the 
defense firms were slightly more profitable. However, 
statistical test showed the performance was not significantly 
different. (Bohi, 1973, p. 725) 
The second hypothesis tested was to see if there was 
a relationship between the percentage of total business 
attributed to government business and the profitability of the 
firm. The results of the study showed that there was no 
significant correlation between the two variables. 26 of the 
3 6 firms in the sample registered a decline in the percentage 
of total business attributed to the government. Of the 2 6 
firms, 11 had a declining profit rate and 15 had an increasing 
profit rate. 10 of the 3 6 firms in the sample registered an 
increase in the percentage of total business attributed to the 
government. Of the 10 firms, 3 had declining profit rates and 
7 had increasing profit rates. Overall, the profit rate moved 
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in the same direction as the percentage of total business in 
18 cases and moved in the opposite direction in the other 18. 
(Bohi, 1973, p. 726) 
The final issue was to determine if profitability 
for defense firms had changed from the period 1960-64 to 1965- 
69 (i.e. did profitability change because of the Vietnam War) . 
Profit rates for the defense firms did increase, but so did 
manufacturing profits in general. However, the increases were 
not significantly different between the two groups. (Bohi, 
1973, p. 727) 
The results of Bohi's research was profitability in 
the defense industry was not significantly different from 
profitability in manufacturing firms in general. One would 
surmise that if they are not significantly different, then 
they are roughly similar. As Bohi said in conclusion: 
On the basis of the sample of 36 defense 
contractors considered here there is no evidence 
for arguing that defense business is any more or 
less profitable than non-defense business in 
general. (Bohi, 1973, p. 728) 
2.  Department of Defense Studies 
In 1976 DOD sponsored a study called "Profit 76". 
The purpose of the study was to review DOD's profit policy and 
recommend changes. The study compared return on sales and 
return on total assets of defense contractors with the Federal 
Trade Commission durable goods manufacturers. The results 
showed the defense firms earned a smaller return on sales than 
the commercial activities but a higher return on total assets. 
Profit 76 concluded that pre-tax return on sales actually 
realized on government contracts was significantly less than 
what was negotiated by contracting officers. The study 
attributed the differences (and lower return on sales) to cost 
overruns. The study group believed the higher return on total 
assets was due to the lower capital investment required of 
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defense firms. The lower investment was because the government 
provided much of the equipment and plant space. (DOD, 1976) 
In 1983 DOD sponsored a second study, the Defense 
Financial and Investment Review. This review continued the 
work of "Profit 76" by studying 1975 to 1983 data. The study 
concluded that from 1970 to 1979 profits for defense firms 
were comparable to ones earned in the durable goods 
manufacturers. Further, during the period 1980 to 1983 the 
average defense profits decreased slightly while profits of 
durable goods manufacturers dropped dramatically. The reason 
given for this difference was better defense firms performance 
(due to rising defense spending) and a decrease in inflation. 
(DOD, 1985) 
3.  Willis R Greer, Jr. and Shu S. Liao - 1984 
In "A New Look at Risk and Profitability in Defense 
Contracting", Professors Greer and Liao examined risk and 
profitability in the defense industry. The objectives of their 
study were to answer the following three questions: 
1. Is the profitability of DOD contracts influenced by 
the state of capacity utilization in the industry? 
2. How profitable are the major aerospace contractors in 
their DOD versus commercial business segments? 
3. Given the risk levels faced by contractors, is the 
return earned on DOD business equivalent to that 
earned on commercial work? 
The analysis covered the period 1963 to 1982 and included 
approximately 25 aerospace firms. Profitability was measured 
by two ratios, return on sales and return on net worth. (Greer 
and Liao, 1984) 
Greer and Liao concluded that defense contractor 
profitability was influenced by the state of capacity 
utilization. When utilization was low, profitability was also 
low. However, when utilization was high, profitability in the 
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defense industry approach compatibility with the commercial 
sector. The dividing line between the two was believed to be 
80% capacity utilization. However, profitability would 
probably not reach parity until the 92.8% capacity utilization 
point was reached. Greer and Liao pointed out that at no time 
doing the period under study did the aerospace industry reach 
that point. (Greer and Liao, 1984, p. 26) 
In comparing profitability in defense verses 
commercial segments, Greer and Liao found that the average 
profit rate on defense business was lower than for commercial 
business. They regressed the firm's percentage of defense 
business (independent variable) against the two profitability 
measures (dependant variable). For return on sales the 
coefficient for the independent variable was negative for all 
20 years. This indicated that defense business had a negative 
impact on return on sales. For return on net worth, 15 of the 
20 years had a negative coefficient for the independent 
variable and the other 5 had a positive coefficient, However, 
the 5 were not statistically significant. (Greer and Liao, 
1986, p. 1262) Using return on sales as the profitability 
measure, defense business return on sales ranged from 18.8% to 
71.1% as high as the return on commercial business. Return on 
net worth for defense business ranged from 60.6% to 115% of 
the profit rate on commercial business. There was one period 
of three years where defense return on net worth exceeded the 
commercial segments. Greer and Liao attributed this exception 
to a revised profit policy (DPC 76-3) in effect during that 
time. (Greer and Liao, 1984, p. 25) 
In their study of risk, Greer and Liao used three 
measures of risk: the standard deviation of return on net 
worth, the relationship between the Price Stability Index 
(PSI) and the percentage of total business attributed to the 
government, and the relationship of the firm's "beta" ( a 
measure of the volatility of a firm's stock returns in 
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relation to the overall market) to the same percentage of 
government business. The results showed the standard deviation 
of return on net worth for defense work was 4.2% and for 
commercial work 3.2%. The disparity leads one to believe 
defense work is riskier than commercial work. Comparison of 
the PSI and the percentage of government business showed an 
inverse relationship, as the percentage increased, PSI would 
decrease and vice versa. This relationship also suggests that 
defense business is riskier. The results of comparing the 
firm's beta with the percentage of government business was not 
as clear. Betas for the defense firms were higher than the 
market averages but the magnitude of the beta was not related 
to the percentage of government business. (Greer and Liao, 
1984, pp. 26-27) 
In summary, Greer and Liao said: 
The generally lower returns found for DOD business 
might be acceptable if the attendant risk were 
lower. However, none of the three risk measures 
used show DOD business to be less risky than 
commercial. (Greer and Liao, 1984, p. 26) 
4.  Kenyon Kramer and John Morse - 1985 
In "DOD Contractor Profitability 1980 - 1984", 
Kramer and Morse compared DOD contractor profitability with 
the commercial segment. The data collected covered the period 
1980 through 1984. They took a sample of 49 defense firms and 
compared their performance with the Fortune 500 average. The 
sample of 49 defense firms were divided into two groups. One 
group, composed of 3 6 firms, had government sales of less than 
30% of total sales. The other group of 13 firms had government 
sales greater than 30%. Kramer and Morse used return on net 
worth as their measure of profitability. 
Kramer and Morse first attempted to determine on an 
industry wide basis if the defense industry was more or less 
profitable than the commercial sector. Only the results of two 
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years were found to be statistically different. In 1983 all 
samples of defense firms (the groups of 49, 36, and 13) were 
more profitable than the Fortune 500. In 1984 the sample of 49 
and 13, were more profitable than the Fortune 500. The sample 
of 36 was not. The results of the previous years, 1980 - 1982, 
were not statistically different. So at a macro level, defense 
business was as profitable or more profitable than the 
commercial sector. (Kramer and Morse, 1985, pp. 38 - 42) 
Next, Kramer and Morse attempted to determine if 
there was a relationship between the percentage of total 
business received from defense and profitability. They 
regressed return on net worth against the percentage of 
defense business. The regression did not offer any strong 
results. Kramer and Morse concluded "there is little or no 
apparent relationship between the proportion of DOD sales and 
profitability". (Kramer and Morse, 1985, pp. 45-58) 
Kramer and Morse next tried to assess whether 
defense firms faced more or less risk. To measure risk, Kramer 
and Morse used the standard deviation of return on net worth. 
The standard deviation of the sample of 49 firms was roughly 
equivalent to the Fortune 500 and the sample of 36 firms was 
similar. However, the variability of the returns for the 
sample of 13 firms was quite larger than the Fortune 500. In 
summary, Kramer and Morse concluded that when risk and return 
were compared there appeared to be no relationship between 
profitability and risk during this period. (Kramer and Morse, 
1985, pp. 49-50) 
At the micro level, Kramer and Morse compared the 
performance of the defense segments of firms with the other 
segments of the firms. Kramer and Morse took 11 of the 13 
firms who had greater than 3 0% government business and divided 
the firm up into defense segment and non-defense segments. In 
these tests Kramer and Morse used operating margin as the 
measure of profitability.  When the profitability of the 
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different segments were compared, it showed that the 
government segments consistently out-performed the commercial 
segments and the risk (standard deviation) for the government 
segments were lower. However, only in 1983 was the difference 
statistically different. Consequently, although defense 
business appears more profitable and less risky, there was no 
statistical proof it was so. (Kramer and Morse, 1985, 
pp. 61 - 67) 
5.  Summary 
The results of much of the studies were 
inconclusive. Most statistical test performed did not show 
profitability and risk to be significantly different between 
defense and commercial sectors. Bohi concluded that defense 
business was not any more or less profitable than non-defense 
business. Profit 76 gave a conflicting story and the Defense 
Financial and Investment Review said defense performed better 
than durable goods manufacturers. Greer and Liao concluded 
that defense was less profitable and more risky than 
commercial sectors. Kramer and Morse showed defense to be 
generally more profitable and less risky but could only prove 
that point infrequently. So the results are mixed and 
confusing. 
Part of the work done in these studies directly 
relates to the topic of this paper, comparing the percentage 
of total revenue derived from defense business with the 
financial condition of the firm. The aspects of financial 
condition measured in these studies were limited to 
profitability and risk. Bohi compared return on net worth 
with the percentage of defense business and found no 
correlation between the two. Greer and Liao regressed return 
on sales and net worth against the percentage of defense 
business. They found defense business had a negative impact of 
the two profitability measures. Greer and Liao also compared 
the percentage of defense business with the firms beta but 
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couldn't find a relationship between the two. Finally, Kramer 
and Morse regressed return on net worth against the percentage 
of defense business, but again could not find any correlation 
between the two. Once again the results are mixed. 
C.  CONCLUSION 
Given what has been said before, the defense industry is 
not necessarily an attractive business to enter into. Why then 
do firms do so? Why do firms remain in the industry? A survey 
of corporate executives gave the following five reasons 
(listed in order of preference): 
1. Government funding of research and development. Work 
done for DOD can sometimes be transferred to 
commercial products. 
2. The large volume of business (in billions of dollars) 
gives the firm the image of being very large. 
3. Provides the firm's managers an opportunity to manage 
a large, high-tech program. 
4. The long term nature of defense programs. Once the 
firm is awarded a development contract they are 
assured of approximately 10 to 20 years of work. 
5. Countercyclical balance for civilian business. 
(Gansler, 1980, pp. 41-43) 
Greer and Liao added three other reasons: 
1. The return on investment maybe higher for the defense 
firms because the government finances a portion of the 
investment. 
2. The firm will try to shift as much of their overhead 
burden to the defense business. This will make their 
commercial segment more competitive. 
3. The firm hopes to gain a marketing advantage. If they 
can produce a state of the art weapon system, then it 
must be capable of producing a very good commercial 
product. (Greer and Liao, 1986, p. 1266) 
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As one can see there is more to it then just 
profitability. One has to consider the impact of defense 
business on the firm's overall financial condition. That is 
what this study hopes to accomplish. In the next chapter, a 
framework will be developed to measure financial condition. 
Although risk and return will be important elements in the 




III.  METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
In this chapter the sample, measurements and statistical 
tests to be used will be discussed in detail. How firms were 
selected for the sample, the time period covered by the 
sample, and the particular information collected for each firm 
will be presented and justified. Next, the measurements used 
to represent financial condition and reliance on government 
business will be introduced and discussed. Finally, the 
statistical tests used to answer each secondary research 
question will be delineated. By the end of this chapter, one 
should have an understanding of the information and techniques 
used to answer the research questions of this thesis. 
A.  DATA 
1.  Sample Firms 
The sample firms were drawn from a database of 50 
defense firms available at the Naval Postgraduate School. 
These firms were initially extracted from the "Top 100 Defense 
Contractors for FY 1990" (Source: Directorate for Information 
Operations and Reports, Department of Defense, released 1991). 
The selection from this list was based on size and diversity. 
Since the defense industry is composed of a broad collection 
of sub-industries (aerospace, ADP, etc.), firms were selected 
to give an adequate representation of the various sub- 
industries. The largest defense contractors were selected 
based on total assets and net contract value. 
Of the original list of 50 firms, only 37 will be 
used in this study. Twelve were deleted because the amount of 
defense sales could not be obtained. One, LTV, was deleted 
because it started the period in sever financial distress and 
remained that way for the entire period. Since the purpose of 
this thesis is to determine the relationship between financial 
condition and reliance on government business, a firm in such 
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condition would not be able to reflect such a relationship. Of 
the remaining 37 firms, 10 had only partial information on 
defense sales (data for some years were missing). These 10 
firms will be included in the analysis for years when defense 
sales are present but will be ignored otherwise. Appendix B 
provides a list of the 37 firms in the sample, the years in 
which data is provided, and a list of the firms categorized by 
sub-industry. 
2.  Time Period 
The time period selected for study is: 1983 through 
1992. This period was selected because it was a time where 
defense spending both increased and decreased. An essential 
element of this study is to compare the relationship of 
financial condition and reliance between a period of growing 
defense spending and declining defense spending. For this 
thesis, the growth period will be 1983 - 1986 and decline 1987 
- 1992. 
The selection of 1986/1987 as the dividing line was 
based on Figure 1. Figure 1 is a graph of the budget authority 
and actual outlays for the Procurement and Research, 
Development, Testing, and Evaluation (RDT&E) appropriations 
(in constant FY 1995 dollars). Procurement and RDT&E 
appropriations were used to determine defense spending in the 
two periods vice total defense appropriations because these 
two most directly affect the defense industry. Budget 
authority was included because contracts could not be issued 
until the program was funded. Outlays were included because it 
identifies when the defense firms actually received payment. 
It's reasonable to assume that defense firms would recognize 
revenue somewhere between the two events, after funding is 
authorized but before payment is received. The point in time 
in which revenue is recognized is important in that it drives 
when sales and their associated cost are reflected in the 
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Figure 1. Procurement and RDT&E; 1983-92; 
(constant FY 95 dollars) 
measure whether the industry is growing or contracting; the 
point at which the state of the industry is reflected in the 
income statement. Based on this assumption, one would estimate 
the end point of the growth period to be between the year 
budget authority peaked (1985) and the year in which outlays 
peaked (1987) . 1986 was selected as the end year of the growth 
period because it falls between the two peaks. 
3.  Data Items 
The financial information on the defense firms in 
the sample were obtained from the firm's annual financial 
statements, the firm's 10K reports filed with the Securities 
and Exchange Commission, and Moody's industrial manual. These 
three sources provided a sufficient amount of financial data 
for analysis. The data items obtained were: 
• Balance  Sheet:  Cash  and  marketable  securities, 
Receivables, Inventory, Total current assets, Total 
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assets, Accounts payable and accrued expenses, Total 
current liabilities, Long term debt, Other long term 
liabilities, Total liabilities, Preferred stock, 
Retained earnings, and Total stockholders equity. 
Income Statement; Net sales, Total revenue from 
government, Cost of Goods Sold, Depreciation, 
amortization, and depletion expense, Total operating 
expenses, Net operating income, Interest Expense, 
Income tax expense, Total income from continuing 
operations, and Net Income. 
B.  MEASURES OF FINANCIAL CONDITION AND RELIANCE 
1.  Financial Condition 
The financial condition of the firms in this study 
will be measured using a collection of financial ratios. 
Ratios are valuable tools in that they measure various 
attributes of a firm and reflect relationships between 
different accounts. They also facilitate comparisons between 
two or more firms, between a firm and an industry, and the 
performance of a firm over a period of time. These comparisons 
yield useful insights into a firm's condition and operations. 
Additionally, each ratio offers a different aspect of a firm's 
condition (profitability, asset utilization, solvency, etc.), 
and when taken as a whole, these various aspects should give 
one a fairly comprehensive view. For these reasons, a select 
group of financial ratios were deemed to adequately measure 
financial condition. 
The group of ratios to be used in this study had to 
meet two criteria. One, each account appearing on the Balance 
Sheet and Income Statement had to be reflected in at least one 
of the ratios. The account could be either presented directly 
into a ratio (such as sales in total assets turnover) or 
included in a total or subtotal (such as cash in current 
assets). This was to ensure the ratios were comprehensive in 
terms of the financial statements. Secondly, all aspects of a 
firm's financial condition had to be addressed (such as 
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profitability, solvency, etc.)- There are many ways in which 
to label these various aspects. However, for this study, the 
categories and labels developed by Pinches, Mingo, and 
Caruthers (1973) will be used. These labels are: 
• Return on Investment 
• Capital Intensiveness 
• Inventory Intensiveness 
• Receivables Intensiveness 
• Financial Leverage 
• Short-term Liquidity 
• Cash Position 
The categories and labels were derived from a study 
done by Pinches, Mingo, and Caruthers (1973) that classified 
ratios into groups that were highly correlated with one and 
another. Using Pinches, Mingo, and Caruthers classifications 
avoided redundancy in ratios chosen. Redundancy arises when 
two or more ratios measure the same aspect. An example is the 
current ratio and the acid test ratio. They both measure 
basically the same situation and are therefore highly 
correlated with one and another. Consequently, only one of the 
ratios needs to be employed. The use of Pinches, Mingo, and 
Caruthers classifications allowed the number of ratios to be 
kept small but at the same time represented almost all of the 
different facets of a firm's operation. 
In a study completed by Pinches, Mingo, Caruthers, 
and Eubank- (1975), specific financial ratios (two per 
classification) that most closely depicted the empirically 
defined financial ratio classifications were offered. Of these 
14 ratios, one from each classification was chosen to measure 
financial condition in this study. These ratios are: 
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• Return on net worth 
• Total asset turnover 
• Inventory turnover 
• Longterm debt/Total capital 
• Receivables/Sales 
• Current ratio 
• Cash/Total assets 
Two additional ratios were added, operating profit 
margin and return on total assets. These two ratios were added 
due to the criticality of profitability to a firm's financial 
condition. Problems elsewhere in a firm's operation can be 
overcome if a firm is very profitable. However, if a firm is 
not very profitable then no matter how well structured the 
firm is, it is in serious trouble. Therefore, additional 
perspectives of this area was desired. Operating profit and 
return on total assets provide the desired additional 
insights. Operating profit margin reflects the firm's ability 
to control cost and return on total assets indicates the 
firm's ability to earn a return on funds supplied from all 
sources. The addition of these two ratios is meant to add to 
the description of a firms return on investment provided by 
return on net worth so that a more detailed representation is 
obtained. The final framework for measuring financial 
condition is provided in Table 1. 
2.  Reliance on Government Business 
The percentage of total sales that is received from 
government business will be used as a measure of a firm's 
reliance on government business. Since revenue is critical to 
a firm's continued operation, it follows that the larger the 
share of revenue received from one source, the greater the 
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TD - Current Liab 
TA - Current Liab 
Current Assets 
Current Liabilities 
NI + Depreciation 
Total Assets 
Table 1. Framework for measuring financial condition 
There may be other measures of reliance, but none appear to be 
conceptually more accurate than the percentage of total 
revenue. Using the percentage of total revenue gives us an 
objective, verifiable number that is supported conceptually as 
being a fair representation of reliance on government 
business. 
C.  METHODOLOGY 
Least square regression and tests for differences between 
group means will be used to answer the research questions. In 
the following paragraphs the individual tests used to answer 
the secondary research questions will be specified. The final 
paragraph will discuss different methods used to ensure the 
regression models obtained during the testing are the most 
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appropriate ones (provide the best fit). 
1. Secondary Research Question #1 
Is the financial condition of defense firms 
directly related to the amount of government 
business? 
Least square regression will be used to answer the 
first secondary research question. Each of the nine ratios 
will be regressed against the percentage of total revenue 
received from government business. Regression will be done for 
the entire sample (all 38 firms over the 10 year period, by 
the two periods of growth and decline (all 38 firms over the 
period 1983 - 1986 and again for 1987 - 1992) , and finally for 
each year. The regressions covering the entire 10 year period 
and the two periods of growth and decline will be the 
principal regressions analyzed. The regressions done for each 
year will be used to elaborate on a specific situation or to 
resolve any possible confusion in the principal analysis. R2 
and the "P" statistic will be used to select the ratios that 
have a significant relationship with the percentage of total 
revenue that is received from government contracts.1 
2. Secondary Research Question #2 
Given a change in the defense industry, is change 
in the financial condition of the defense firms 
dependent on the amount of government business? 
To answer this question it will be necessary to 
divide the sample  into two groups and perform separate 
'Outliers will be investigated to determine if they are 
valid (i.e. a negative return on net worth because 
stockholders equity is negative will be rejected). If the 
outlier is valid, then they will be brought in closer to the 
distribution curve to form the gradual ending slope of the 
curve. Their relative position will be maintained (the highest 
value will remain the highest value). 
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analysis for the two time periods (growth and decline in 
defense spending) . The one group will be composed of those 
firms whose percentage of total revenue from government 
business is below 35% for the entire 10 year period and the 
other group will contain those firms whose percentage remains 
above 35% for the entire period. The 35% cutoff was selected 
for two reasons. One, a lower number is preferred because it 
minimizes the impact of government business on the firm. 
Secondly, the 3 5% cutoff provide two groups of roughly equal 
size. The below 35% group contained 16 firms and the above 35% 
group contained 14 firms. Seven firms in the sample could not 
be used in the sample because their percentage of government 
business ranged from below 35% to above 35%. The firms were 
grouped as follows: 
• Firms above 3 5% government business: E-Systems, EG&G, 
General Dynamics, Grumman, Lockheed, Martin Marietta, 
McDonnel Douglas, Raytheon, Rockwell, United Industrial 
Corp., Computer Science Corp., Dynamics, Loral, and 
Northrup. 
• Firms below 3 5% government business: General Electric, 
Honeywell, IBM, ITT, Johnson Controls, Morrison 
Knudsen, Olin, United Technologies, Westinghouse, Black 
and Decker, Eaton, Unisys, Motorola, Control Data, 
Hewlitt-Packard, and Texas Instruments. 
• Firms excluded: FMC, Gencorp, Teledyne, Harris, Boeing, 
TRW, and Harsco. 
To measure the change in financial condition, the 
difference between a given ratio in one year and the same 
ratio in the previous year will be used. Next the average of 
the change in the ratio (separate average for each group) will 
be calculated for each year. The means of the two groups will 
be plotted to render an overall view of the situation. 
Additionally, "t" tests will be performed to determine if the 
means of the two groups (high and low reliance) are 
statistically different. Based on the plot and the "t" test, 
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sufficient information should be obtained to determine whether 
the change in financial condition of defense firms are 
dependent on the amount of government business. 
3.  Secondary Research Question #3 
Did firms that changed their reliance on government 
business do better or worse than firms who didn't? 
Least square regression will be used to answer this 
question. The change in a financial ratio (dependent variable) 
will be regressed against the change in percentage of total 
revenue (independent variable). The change will be measured by 
the difference between a given measurement from two points in 
time. These differences and subsequent regressions will be 
calculated in four sets: 
1. 1992 measure less 1983 measure - to give an overall 
picture for the entire period. 
2. 1986 measure less 1983 measure - to identify the 
relationship in a period of increasing defense 
spending. 
3. 1992 measure less 1987 measure - to identify the 
relationship in a period of decreasing spending. 
4. Lag the ratio and percentage measure by two years and 
lag the percentage two years behind the ratio (i.e. 
ratio1987 - ratio1985 regressed against %1985 - %19g3) - 
permits one to measure the effect of a change in 
reliance on government business on subsequent periods. 
Each regression will include all 37 firms. The four sets of 
regressions will be done for each ratio. 
4.  Secondary Research Question #4 
Do these previous relationships depend on whether 
the industry is in a period of increasing or 
decreasing defense spending? 
In the tests performed for the previous three 
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secondary research questions, a separate analysis will be 
conducted for each period (growth and decline). This will be 
done by dividing the sample into two groups (1983-86 data and 
1987-92 data) and running the same tests as before. The 
results of the tests will be compared with one and another to 
determine if there is any difference. 
5.  Residual Analysis 
One cannot accept the output of least square 
regression at face value. To ensure the regression model 
adequate depict the actual relationships, residual analysis 
will be performed and various plots generated. The sample's 
dependent and independent variables will be plotted to 
identify the characteristic of the relationship (linear, 
curvilinear, etc.) The error terms will be plotted against the 
fitted value to check for constant variance in error terms and 
for any pattern not identified in the regression model. A 
histogram of the error terms and dependent variable will be 
obtained to ensure a normal distribution is present. Finally, 
the Durbin-Watson statistic will be obtained to check for 
independence in error terms. The use of these procedures 
should ensure the regression models derived from the tests are 
appropriate. 
D.  CONCLUSION 
The objective of this thesis is to determine the 
relationship between a defense firms' reliance on government 
business and the financial condition of the firm. To determine 
the relationship, measures of reliance (percentage of total 
revenue) and of financial condition (nine select financial 
ratios) were developed. Financial data on a sample of 38 
defense firms was obtained for a period that is divided 
between a period of growth and decline. The various aspects of 
the relationship have been captured in a set of four research 
questions. Appropriate statistical test for each research 
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question has been identified. Based on this framework, it is 
believed that the results of this study should give an 
adequate description of the relationship between reliance on 
government business and financial condition. 
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IV.  ANALYSIS 
This chapter will provide the results of the tests 
performed and an analysis of those results. The secondary- 
research questions will be addressed in numerical order. Each 
secondary research question will be restated and a brief 
description of the test performed will be offered. Next, any 
statistically significant results will be presented and 
discussed. If any particular result is not mentioned, one can 
assume that the test were not significant. By the conclusion 
of this chapter the reader will know the outcomes of the tests 
and their implications, if any. 
A.  SECONDARY RESEARCH QUESTION #1 
Is the financial condition of defense firms 
directly related to the amount of government 
business? 
For secondary research question #1, each of the nine 
financial ratios were separately regressed against the 
percentage of total sales attributed to government business. 
Regressions were done for three different periods: the full 
sample (1983 through 1992), the growth period (1983 through 
1986), and the declining period (1987 through 1992). The 
results were weak. Very few ratios proved to be related to 
percentage of government business. Of those that were related, 
the relationship was slight (low R2 value) and some violated 
one or more of the assumptions of regression analysis - 
constant variance, normality inherent in error distribution, 
etc. Which suggest that the relationship may be exaggerated in 
its present form. Most of the ratios were unrelated to 
government revenue. Table 2 provides a list of the ratios that 
proved to be statistically significant (a significance level 
of .10 was used as a cutoff). The shaded boxes of Table 2 
indicates those regression which were statistically 
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Time Period Equation R2 P value 
1983 to 1992 
RONW=.06484+.09858(PCGB) .0232 .0120 
ROA=.03 09 3+.03 718(PCGB) .0274 .0062 
CAPTO=1.07164+.64845(PCGB) .1322 .0001 
RECT0=.18961-.04586(PCGB) .0369 .0014 
CURR=1.46690+.22807(PCGB) .0152 .0419 
1983 TO 1986 
RONW=.07678+.13017(PCGB) .0827 .0027 
ROA=.04 6 2 4+.04 04 3(PCGB) .0375 .0455 
RECTO=.17368-.04928(PCGB) .0801 .0031 
CAPTO=1.07415+.817 60(PCGB) .2555 .0001 
INVTO=4.43175+5.2353(PCGB) . 1093 .0005 
1987 TO 1992 
CAPTO=l.07301+.523 01(PCGB) .0790 ,0003 
CURR=1.27084+.58586(PCGB) .1238 .0001 
Table 2.Results from Secondary Research Question #1, 
significant but violated one or more of the assumptions of 
regression. 
For the full sample, five ratios proved to be 
significantly related to government business: return on net 
worth (RONW), return on total assets (ROA), total asset 
turnover (CAPTO), receivables turnover (RECTO), and current 
ratio (CURR). However, with R2 values of 0.0232, 0.0274, 
.1322, .0369, and .0152, respectfully, government business 
explains only a very small portion of the variance in these 
ratios. In addition, CAPTO, RECTO, and CURR ratios violated 
one or more of the assumptions of regression. All three lacked 
constant variance in the error terms. Plus, the error terms 
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for both CAPTO or CURR did not sum to zero. Finally, the error 
terms for CURR did not have a normal distribution. Operating 
income (OPINC), inventory turnover (INVTO), financial leverage 
(FIN), and cash position (CSHPOS) were not related to 
percentage of government business in this period. 
For the growth period, five ratios proved to be 
statistically significant: RONW, ROA, RECTO, CAPTO, and INVTO. 
Although the R2 values are higher, they are still too low to 
warrant much interest. Two of the five ratios, CAPTO and 
INVTO, violated one or more of the assumptions underlying 
regression (constant variance in error terms, sum of the error 
terms egual zero, and normality of error distribution). OPINC, 
CURR, FIN, and CSHPOS were not related to percentage of 
government business. 
The results for the declining period were the most 
meager. There were two ratios significantly related to 
government business: CAPTO and CURR. However, both had low R2 
values and violated two assumptions of regression (constant 
variance in error terms and sum of the error terms egual 
zero). All of the other ratios were not related to percentage 
of government business. 
Is there a relationship between a defense firm's 
financial condition and its reliance of government business? 
The results of these tests provide a mixed answer. Most of the 
regressions that were found to be statistically significant 
explained very little of the variation in the ratios (there is 
one exception) . The low R2 value associated with those 
regressions means the explanatory value of the independent 
variable (percentage of government revenue) is weak. Some 
other factor or factors, are responsible for much of the 
variation in the financial ratios. However, the regressions do 
provide some information of value. 
The one exception mentioned above was CAPTO. This ratio 
was found to be statistically significant (at a level of .01) 
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in all three time periods. However, the fact that each of the 
CAPTO regressions violated one or more of the assumptions of 
regressions, tempers one's enthusiasm for this result. 
Nonetheless, its R2 value was the highest R2 value in two of 
the three time periods (.1322 in 1983 to 1992 and .2555 in 
1983 to 1986) and its R2 value (.079) for the other period 
(1987 to 1992) was "relatively" high. One explanation for 
this result is that the government provides much of the 
critical plant space and equipment to defense firms (Clayton, 
1970, p.121). As a result, defense firms do not have to 
purchase as many manufacturing assets as a commercial firm 
would. Therefore, the asset base of defense firms are smaller 
which results in a higher CAPTO. 
The sign of the coefficient provides an indication of the 
impact (positive or negative) of government business. The 
coefficient for all ratios in Table 1, except for RECTO, was 
positive. These means that as a defense firm increases its 
reliance on government business, these ratios also increase. 
In general, a firm is better off with these ratios increasing. 
RECTO had a negative coefficient which means that as the 
amount of reliance on government business increases, RECTO 
decreases. In general, a firm is better off with a lower RECTO 
ratio. Although the impact of government business is weak (low 
R2 value) the sign of the coefficient show that as a firm's 
reliance on government business increases, the financial 
condition of the firm improves. 
The absence of a relationship also tells us something. 
Three ratios, OPINC, FIN, and CSHPOS, did not show any 
relationship with the percentage of sales attributed to 
government business. This would lead one to conclude that the 
percentage of sales attributed to government business has no 
impact on a firm's OPINC, FIN, and CSHPOS. 
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B.  SECONDARY RESEARCH QUESTION #2 
Given a change in the defense industry, is change 
in the financial condition of defense firms 
dependent on the amount of government business? 
To answer this research question, the sample was divided 
into two groups, those firms with revenue from government 
business less than 35% of their total revenue and those firms 
whose revenue from government business was greater than 35% of 
their total revenue. The differences between ratios in two 
successive years were taken and averages of the differences 
for each group were computed. A T-test was performed to 
determine whether the average change in the ratios were 
statistically different between the two groups at a 
significance level of 10%. 
This procedure was performed to measure the change in the 
ratios from 1983 to 1986 and from 1987 to 1992. Only one 
ratio, CURR, in the 1987 to 1992 period, was statistically 
different. The greater than 3 5% group's CURR ratio increased 
by .41 while the less than 35% group CURR ratio decreased by 
.27. None of the other tests for these two periods were 
significant. 
The procedure was also applied between successive years 
for the time period under study (i.e. 1983 to 1984, 1984 to 
1985, etc.) Table 3 contains the averages computed for the 
change in the ratios between successive years. The shaded 
areas of Table 3 are the tests where ratio changes were 
determined to be significantly different between the high and 
low government business groups. Only 17% of the T-test 
performed proved to be statistically significant. Despite the 
small number of statistically significant results some 
information can be glean from the test. 
If the average change in a ratio is not statistically 
different between the two groups, then one could consider them 
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Table 3. Results from Secondary Research Question #2 
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as roughly equal. Therefore, one would conclude that a firm's 
degree of reliance on government business does not effect its 
financial condition as measured by such a ratio. None of the 
T-tests performed showed CAPTO, RECTO, and FIN ratios to be 
statistically different over any period of time included in 
the study. One could surmise that change in these ratios are 
not dependent in the amount of government business received by 
the firm. 
One pattern of statistically significant results is 
present. There were three time periods in which four of the 
nine ratios were statistically different. In each case the 
ratios moved in the same direction (the group moved in the 
same direction). Specifically: 
• 1984 to 1985: RONW, OPINC, ROA, and CSHPOS were all 
statistically different. For each ratio, the average 
for the greater than 3 5% group changed in a manner 
which improved the financial condition for those 
defense firms (if both ratios moved in a direction 
unfavorable to a firm's financial condition, the 
greater than 3 5% group changed less than the other 
group). 
• 1985 to 1986: RONW, ROA, INVTO, and CSHPOS were all 
statistically different. For each ratio, the average 
for the less than 3 5% group changed in a manner more 
favorable to a firm's financial condition than the 
greater than 35% group. 
• 1990 to 1991: RONW, OPINC, ROA, and CSHPOS were all 
statistically different. Like the 1984 to 1985 time 
period, these same ratios for the greater than 35% 
group changed in a manner more favorable to a firms 
financial condition than the less than 35% group. 
One should keep in mind the data items included in the 
equations for these ratios. All of the ratios listed above are 
derived from the Income Statement. Net income is used to 
calculate RONW, ROA, and CSHPOS. EBIT and sales are used for 
OPINC. INVTO uses cost of goods sold in its calculations. What 
drives the amounts reported on the Income Statement is what 
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cost are matched with which sales and when these sales are 
recognized as current revenue. Therefore, one possible 
explanation for this pattern is the sales (and their 
associated costs) that were recognized as current revenue was 
significantly different between two groups for these time 
periods (i.e. large purchases of major weapons systems 
contracted for at the start of the buildup reached a point 
where the firms could recognize the revenue from these 
contracts) 
Little of value was obtained from this secondary research 
question. A plot of the averages for the two groups were 
prepared (one plot for each ratio) . However, there was no 
clear pattern present so the plots did not reveal any 
additional information. The three time periods discussed in 
the previous paragraph are interesting. However, due to the 
fact that this relationship exists for only three of the nine 
periods, it is not of much use. 
C.  SECONDARY RESEARCH QUESTION #3 
Did firms that changed their reliance on government 
business do better or worse than firms that didn't. 
Least square regression was used to answer this question. 
The difference in a financial ratio between two points in time 
was regressed against the difference in the firm's percentage 
of total revenue attributed to government business between two 
points in time. Four regression were done: 1992 less 1983 (the 
full sample), 1986 less 1983 (the growth period), 1992 less 
1987 (declining period), and the full sample again except the 
change in the percentage of government business was lagged two 
years behind the change in the ratio (e.g. the difference in 
a ratio between 1985 and 1987 was regressed against the 
difference in percentage between 1983 and 1985). Thus, 36 
regressions were run, one for each of the nine ratios, for 
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each of the four time periods. 
Out of the 36 regressions performed only one ratio (i.e. 
the change in that ratio) proved to be related to the change 
in reliance on government business. The ratio was RECTO and 
the relationship existed for only one period of time, 1983 to 
1986. The equation was: 
RECTO=0.011656 - 0.158678(PCGB) 
The R2 was 0.1865 and the P value was .0447. The equation 
indicates that as a firm's reliance on government business 
increases, its RECTO decreases. Assuming all other factors 
remain constant a decreasing RECTO has a favorable impact on 
a firm's financial condition. However with a low R2 value of 
0.1865, the reliance on government business explains only a 
small part of the change in RECTO. With only one out of 3 6 
regressions proven to be significant, it appears that changing 
a firms reliance on government business had no systematic 
impact on a firm's financial condition. 
D.  SECONDARY RESEARCH QUESTION #4 
Do these previous relationships depend on whether 
the industry is in a period of increasing or 
decreasing defense spending? 
In each of the secondary research questions, specific 
tests were performed for the two different time periods 
(growth and decline). The weak results of the tests make it 
difficult to make comparisons between the two periods. 
However, one distinction did emerge. For any relationships 
identified, the relationships in the growth period were 
stronger and more frequent than in the declining period. 
The findings from each secondary research question 
support this conjecture. In the first secondary research 
question, the growth period had as many or more relationships 
than any other period (full sample or the declining period) 
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and these relationships were stronger (higher R2 value). The 
growth period had five regression models (two of which 
violated assumptions of regression), the full sample had five 
regression models (but three violated assumptions of 
regression), and the declining period only had two regression 
models (both of which violated assumptions of regressions) . 
The R2 values for the growth period were higher than both the 
full sample and declining period. It appears that the 
"relatively" strong relationship that existed in the growth 
period was reduced in the full sample because of the effect of 
the declining period. In the second secondary research 
question, three years had four of the nine ratios 
significantly different between the two groups. Two of the 
three were in the growth period and only one in the declining 
period. In the third secondary research question, the only 
relationship established occurred in growth period. 
Although the justification is weak, the results of the 
tests seem to indicate that if a relationship between 
financial condition and reliance on government business 
exists, it is more apparent and stronger when defense spending 
is increasing. If one is to find a relationship, then it will 
more likely be found when defense spending is increasing as 
oppose to decreasing. The effect of reliance on government 
business, disappears or is minimal when defense spending 
declines. 
E.  CONCLUSION 
Only 17% of all the tests conducted provided 
statistically significant results (at a significance level of 
10%). Of the results that were significant, their explanatory 
value was minimal (low R2 value) . However, some useful 
information was obtained. Increasing ones' reliance on 
government business tends to have a favorable impact on some 
aspects of a firm's financial condition. CAPTO in particular, 
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is responsive to different levels of government business. The 
impact of a firm's reliance on government business tends to be 
stronger when defense spending is increasing. When defense 
spending is decreasing, the impact is minimal or nonexistent. 
It is interesting to note that of the 162 tests 
performed, the FIN ratio was not related in any manner to 
reliance on government business. All of the other ratios, were 
related at one point or another. Therefore, one can assume 
that reliance on government business has no impact on a firm's 
financial leverage. 
What does all of this mean? The purpose of this thesis 
has been to determine the relationship between reliance on 
government business and financial condition. This chapter has 
looked at particular aspects of a firm's financial condition 
in different circumstances. The next chapter will bring these 
various aspects together to see what overall impact reliance 
on government business has on a firm's financial condition. 
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V.  SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The objective of this thesis was to determine the 
relationship between a defense firm's reliance on government 
business and the financial condition of the firm. This 
relationship is important because the defense industry is as 
critical to the security of the United States as the armed 
forces are. It is the defense industry which provides the arms 
and other materials that enables the armed forces to fulfill 
their responsibilities. Therefore, it is in the country's best 
interest to ensure that transactions between the government 
and the defense industry are such that the financial viability 
of the defense firms are maintained. However, procurement 
scandals such as $600 ashtrays and $800 toilet seats as well 
as cost overruns on almost all major weapon system programs 
have given the public the impression that defense firms earn 
abnormally high profits at the public expense. On the one 
hand, the government should act as responsible stewards of the 
public treasury by not paying excessive amounts to obtain 
these arms. On the other hand, doing business with the 
government should not turn a defense firm into a pauper. If 
this were to be the case, then firms would leave the industry 
and the United States government would be without weapon 
suppliers. So does doing business with the United States 
government enhance or degrade a defense firm's financial 
condition? 
This thesis was not the first attempt at answering this 
question. A number of studies were performed in the past 
comparing the risk and return in the defense industry with the 
commercial world. The results of these studies were mixed and 
confusing. Some showed that defense firms did better than 
commercial firms, some showed commercial firms doing better 
than defense firms, and others said there was no difference 
between the two. The primary difference between this study and 
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the previous ones is that this thesis tried to determine the 
impact of various levels of government business on the overall 
financial condition of the firms. The other studies restricted 
themselves to risk and return and comparisons with commercial 
firms. 
To determine if a relationship between reliance on 
government business and financial condition of defense firms 
existed, data was collected from 37 defense firms over the 
period 1983 to 1992. This particular period was selected 
because there was both a period where defense spending was 
increasing and a period where it was decreasing. Nine ratios, 
representing almost all of the facets of a firm's operation, 
were selected to measure financial condition. The percentage 
of total sales attributed to government business was used to 
measure a firm's reliance on government business. Least square 
regression and tests for differences between group means were 
used to determine if any relationships existed. 
A.  SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
The results of the tests were sporadic and weak. However, 
when a relationship was present, increasing levels of reliance 
had a positive impact on a defense firm's financial condition. 
In particular as reliance on government business was 
increased, profitability, asset utilization, and short term 
liquidity improved. Unfortunately, all of the regression 
models had a low R2 value and many violated the assumptions 
inherent in regression analysis. In short, the impact of 
government business on the financial condition of a defense 
firm is considered to be positive but negligible. 
Three other points should be discussed. One, R2 values 
for the growth period were larger than R2 values obtained from 
any other time period. This suggest that if a relationship 
exist between government business and financial condition, it 
is strongest when the industry is in a growth period. This 
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intuitively makes sense. Any firm in an industry that is 
growing will find its financial condition improving when its 
participation in that industry is growing as well. Second, the 
relatively high R2 value for total asset turnover supports the 
assertion that government provides a significant portion of 
the critical plant and equipment required for production. This 
feature of the defense industry reduces the amount the firm 
has to invest and therefore increases the attractiveness of 
the defense industry to potential participants. Third, at no 
time was financial leverage shown to be related to reliance on 
government business. This lack of relationship leads one to 
conclude that a firm's capital structure is in no way related 
to its reliance on government business. 
This lack of relationship permeates the results of the 
tests conducted for this thesis. What has been summarized so 
far are the few, weak relationships identified. Those 
relationships do not provide sufficient, convincing evidence 
that there is a relationship between reliance on government 
business and financial condition of defense firms. One might 
expect that firms highly dependent on government business to 
out perform those firms with a low reliance on government 
business during the growth period, and the opposite to occur 
when the declining period. However, the test did not offer 
convincing evidence to demonstrate this expectation as being 
true. One might also expected that if a firm changed its 
reliance on government business there would be a corresponding 
change in its financial condition, particularly when defense 
spending was growing or contracting. Only one of the 27 
regressions performed showed any such relationship. Twenty-six 
others did not. The question was then asked if the impact of 
the change in reliance is reflected at a later point in time. 
Consequently, the change in reliance was lagged two years 
behind the change in the financial ratios, but these tests did 
not produce any relationships either. When taken in their 
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entirety, the tests performed simply do not provide 
sufficient, convincing evidence that reliance on government 
business has a direct or systematic impact on a defense firm's 
financial condition. 
B.  CONCLUSIONS 
What is one to conclude from the findings, or more 
accurately, the lack of findings gleaned from the results of 
the tests? Well, one should conclude that the financial 
condition of a defense firm is determined more from "other 
factors" in its environment than its reliance on government 
business. These "other factors" constitute a wide variety of 
elements. Principle among them is the skills and abilities of 
the firm's senior managers. It is these people who can enable 
a firm to succeed by directing its activities away from 
unprofitable industries and toward those full of promise. The 
skills and abilities of the employees of the firm and the 
corporate culture in which they work are what makes a firm 
successful (when given proper direction from above). Patents, 
unique knowledge in a particular technology, and other core 
competencies play a crucial role in the firm's future as well. 
For defense firms in particular, the political clout possessed 
by Congressmen and Senators from the firm's district can be as 
instrumental as a new technological breakthrough. Positions in 
other markets and foreign military sales can also play a role. 
These are just a few examples of the wide variety of elements 
that are at play in determining the financial health of a 
defense firm. The level of participation in the defense 
industry can have a favorable impact on a firm's financial 
condition, but its impact pales in comparison to the impact of 
these "other factors". 
Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that doing 
business with the government doesn't necessarily make a 
company better or worse off. The robust financial health 
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fueled by "excessive" profits cited by defense industry 
critics are simply not present. Neither is poor financial 
condition caused by overly harsh government procurement 
policies. Defense industry is much like any other industry. If 
a firm can profit and improve its operation by entering the 
market it will, and as long as favorable conditions persist, 
the firm will increase its participation in the market. 
However, once the situation is reversed and participation in 
the industry becomes unprofitable or otherwise harmful to the 
firm's operation, then the firm will reduce its participation 
in the market or eliminate it altogether. The driving force 
behind these decisions is not the amount of government 
business, but all the other factors not addressed in this 
study. 
During the defense draw down of the late 1980's and early 
1990's there was considerable concern expressed about 
maintaining the defense industrial base. For those firms whose 
products had only one consumer, the Department of Defense, 
this fear was valid (unless of course it was the sole supplier 
of a critical weapon system). However, for the vast majority 
of defense firms this thesis showed the concern to be 
groundless. Reliance on government business has little impact 
on the financial condition of defense firms. Certainly a great 
number of changes occurred in the defense industry as the size 
of the market shrunk. The number of firms within the industry 
decreased and a large number of defense workers lost their 
jobs. However, the firms themselves did not disappear. Some 
left the industry, others reduced their defense segments, and 
others increased it. It is these "other factors" discussed 
earlier that determines whether a firm prospers or not. The 
chief among these being the ability of their senior managers 
to foresee the change in the defense industry, gauge the 
firm's ability to handle the changing market, and take 
appropriate, effective action. 
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C.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
However, one can not escape the conclusion that the 
degree of reliance on one customer for revenue can have a 
significant impact on a firms operation. However, this impact 
can not be seen in the financial condition of the firm. The 
impact is more likely to be on the internal operation of the 
firm. A defense firm has to adapt itself to deal with the 
unique aspects of the defense industry (monopsony, national 
security concerns, political and international affairs, 
procurement process, etc) , considerations that normal 
commercial firms do not have to face. The use of a case study 
analysis would probably be a more effective way of 
ascertaining the impact of government business. Studying how 
two firms conduct business, one heavily concentrated in 
government business and another with only a incidental 
involvement in government business, would probably reveal more 
of the actual impact of doing business with the government 
than examining the financial condition of the firm. Obviously, 
defense firms have adapted themselves the unique aspects of 
the defense industry because they provided the same end 
result, a financially viable business. 
54 
APPENDIX A. FREE MARKET VS. DEFENSE MARKET 
FREE- MARKET THEORY DEFENSE MARKET 
Many small buyers. One buyer (DOD). 
Many small suppliers. Very Few, large suppliers 
of a given item. 
All items small, perfectly One ship built every few 
divisible, and in large years, for hundreds of 
quantities. millions of dollars each. 
Market sets prices. Monopoly  or   oligopoly 
pricing or "buy in" to 
Free movement in and out 
market. 
Extensive barriers to entry 
and exit. 
Prices set by marginal 
utility. 
Any    price    paid    for    the 
desired military 
performance. 
Prices set by marginal 
costs. 
Prices proportional to 
total cost. 
Prices fall with reduced 
demand. 
Prices rise with reduced 
demand. 
Supply adjust to demand. Large excess capacity. 
Labor highly mobile. Greatly diminishing labor 
mobility. 
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FREE-MARKET THEORY DEFENSE MARKET 
Decreasing or constant Increasing returns to scale 
returns to scale. in region of interest. 
Market shifts rapidly to 7-10 years to develop a new 
changes in supply and demand. system, then 3-5 years to 
produce it. 
Market smoothly reaches Erratic behavior from year 
equilibrium. to year. 
General equilibrium-assumes Cost have been rising at 
prices will return to their approximately 5% per year 
equilibrium value. (excluding inflation). 
Profits equalized across the Wide and consistent profit 
economy. variations between sectors; 
even wider between firms. 
Perfect mobility of capital Heavy debt, difficulty in 
(money). borrowing. 
Mobility of capital (equip.) Large and old capital to 
to changing demand. equipment   "locks   in" 
companies. 
No government involvement. Government is regulator, 
specifier, banker, judge of 
claims, etc. 
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FREE-MARKET THEORY DEFENSE MARKET 
Selection based on price. Selection often based on 
politics, or sole source, 
or "negotiation"; only 8% 
of dollars awarded on price 
competition. 
No externalities, All businesses working for 
DOD must satisfy 
requirements of OSHA, EEO, 
awards to areas of high 
unemployment, small 
business set-asides, etc. 
Prices fixed by market, Most business, with any 
risk, is for "cost plus 
fee". 
All products of a given 
type are the same. 
Essentially, each producers 
products are different. 
Competition is for share 
of market. 
Competition is frequently 
for all or none of a given 
market. 
Production is for inventory. Production occurs after the 
sale is made. 
Size of market established 
by the buyers and sellers. 
Size of market established 
by "third party" (Congress) 
through annual budget. 
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FREE-MARKET THEORY DEFENSE MARKET 
Demand sensitive to price. Demand "threaf'-sensitive, 
or responds to availability 
of new technology; almost 




Relatively stable, multiyear 
commitments. 
Annual commitments, with 
frequent changes. 
Benefits of the purchase 
go to the buyer. 
A "public good" 
Buyer has a choice of 
spending now or saving for 
a later purchase. 
DOD must spend its annual 
congressional 
authorization. 
Source: (Gansler, 1980, pp. 30-31) 
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APPENDIX B. SAMPLE FIRMS 
1. McDonnell Douglas Corp. 
2. Northrup Corp. 
3. Lockheed Corp. 
4. General Dynamics Corp. 
5. General Electric Corp. 
6. Raytheon Co. 
7. United Technologies Corp. 
8. Boeing Co. 
9. Martin Marietta Corp. 
10. Grumman Corp. 
11. Loral Corp. 
12. Rockwell International Corp. 
13. Westinghouse Electric Corp. 
14. TRW Inc. 
15. IBM Corp. 
16. Unisys Corp. 
17. ITT Corp. 
18. Texas Instruments Inc. 
19. Olin Corp. 
20. Computer Sciences Corp. 
21. FMC Corp. 
22. Teledyne Inc. 
23. Johnson Controls Inc. 
24. Motorola Inc. 
25. Gencorp Inc. 
26. Harris Corp. 
27. Honeywell Corp. 
28. Harsco Corp. 
29. Black and Decker Corp. 
30. EG&G Inc. 
31. E-Systems Inc. 
Data available for: 
1983 - 1991 only 
1984 - 1992 only 
all 10 years 
all 10 years 
all 10 years 
all 10 years 
all 10 years 
1983 - 1989 only 
all 10 years 
all 10 years 
1985 - 1992 only 
all 10 years 
all 10 years 
all 10 years 
all 10 years 
1984 - 1992 only 
all 10 years 
all 10 years 
all 10 years 
1987 - 1992 only 
all 10 years 
all 10 years 
1989 - 1992 only 
all 10 years 
all 10 years 
all 10 years 
all 10 years 
all 10 years 
1991 - 1992 only 
1983-88; 1990-92 
all 10 years 
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32. Morrison Knudsen Inc. 
33. Dynamics Corp. 
34. Control Data Corp. 
35. Hewlitt-Packard Inc. 
36. Eaton Corp. 
37. United Industrial Corp. 
Data available for: 
all 10 years 
all 10 years 
1985 - 1992 only 
all 10 years 
1991 - 1992 only 
all 10 years 
Sample firms categorized by sub-industry: 
• Ships: General Dynamics, Westinghouse, Unisys, Morrison 
Knudsen, General Electric, Lockheed, Raytheon, United 
Technologies Corp, and EG&G. 
• Tank and automotive: General Dynamics, FMC, Harsco, 
Teledyne, and Johnson Controls. 
• Aircraft: McDonnell Douglas, United Technologies, 
Lockheed, Grumman, General Dynamics, General Electric, 
Rockwell, Martin Marietta, Westinghouse, E-Systems, 
IBM, Raytheon, Teledyne, Black and Decker, Boeing 
Northrup, and Loral. 
• Missiles: Raytheon, General Dynamics, McDonnell 
Douglas, Texas Instruments, Martin Marietta, Lockheed, 
Rockwell, General Electric, Gencorp, FMC, Westinghouse, 
Honeywell, EG&G, Olin, Northrup, Being, Motorola, and 
Loral. 
• Training systems and services: General Electric, 
Raytheon, Unisys, McDonnell Douglas, General Dynamics, 
Lockheed, Honeywell, Grumman, Westinghouse, United 
Industries, Loral, and Boeing. 
• Automatic data processing: Unisys, IBM, Honeywell, 
Eaton, Computer Science, Martin Marietta, McDonnell 
Douglas, Gencorp, and Harris, Control Data Corp, 
Hewlitt-Packard, and Loral. 
• Electronics and Communications: IBM, Unisys, Martin 
Marietta, General Electric, ITT, Raytheon, 
Westinghouse, Honeywell, Eaton, TRW, Rockwell, 
Lockheed, Grumman, Harris, Computer Science, United 
Technologies, E-Systems, Teledyne, McDonnell Douglas, 
Boeing, Northrup, Loral, Motorola, Control Data Corp, 
and Hewlitt-Packard. 
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• Strategic defense initiative; McDonnell Douglas, 
Lockheed, Martin Marietta, General Electric, Grumman, 
Rockwell, TRW, Raytheon, IBM, Westinghouse, Honeywell, 
General Dynamics, Unisys, ITT, Gencorp, Texas 
Instruments, Teledyne, FMC, and EG&G. 
Source: Military Forum, July/August 1988 
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